[Naturalism. The metaphysics of science. Translated from German by Francisco Mota]. Pamplona: Laetoli, 236 pages.
By Manuel A. Paz y Miño, Editor, Neo-Skepsis
Mahner holds a PhD in zoology from the Free University of Berlin and was a research fellow of Mario Bunge at McGill University in Canada, with whom he co-wrote Foundations of Biophilosophy (Springer, 1997) and to whom he posthumously dedicates his Naturalism (p. 9) published originally in German in 2018.
The problems Mahner deals with in his book, as we shall quickly see, are part of the philosophy of science, specifically the metaphysics and ontology of science. In this way, he rationally demonstrates that in order to do science and scientifically explain reality or nature we do not need to postulate supernatural entities.
Already in the prologue the author clarifies the position that accuses naturalism of reductionism in trying to understand social phenomena when in reality it has more than one concept (p. 7).
He also clarifies very well that naturalism and materialism are not the same and that their antagonists are supernaturalism and idealism respectively. Precisely the central theme of his work is the link between science with naturalism and supranaturalism; he will defend naturalism as a presupposition of science (p. 8).
In the introduction or chapter 1, he tells us that, thanks to the progress of the natural sciences, since the Enlightenment, the conception of the world is naturalistic, that is, "the universe exists by itself, precedes our desire to know and nothing occurs in it that is anomalous...it is uncreated, real and nomothetic [it operates according to natural laws]" (p. 11).
The advance of naturalism is opposed by religions and idealistic philosophies (pp. 11-12) and being naturalism "a philosophical presupposition of science...[it] is an indispensable part of its presuppositions and fundamental rules of the game" that makes scientific knowledge possible (p. 13). Naturalism is, then, a metaphysics of the natural and social sciences (p. 14).
Each of the next 8 chapters raises a series of questions and ends with the main theses as a summary.
Among the main theses of chapter 2 are: that nothing can be said about the transnatural, since it is an empty category; and that something can be understood of supernatural entities by their derivation from the natural and their relatively anthropomorphic character (p. 42).
In those of ch. 3: "Empirical scientific methods, such as observation, measurement and experiment, presuppose various metaphysical assumptions, such as realism, the principle of nomotheticity, the principle "Nothing proceeds from nothing" and a principle of antecedence and causality." But supranaturalism denies or violates these metaphysical principles, with the exception of the postulate of realism (p. 63).
In ch. 4 author maintains as a thesis, among others, that, in order to have empirical proof of the supernatural, it must interact with the natural. For that, it must partly possess, or be able to possess, natural properties; and that "[t]he empiricist claim that one can measure, independently of metaphysical assumptions, the plausibility of hypotheses, both natural and supernatural, with the help of Bayesian confirmation theory, by neutrally processing empirical evidence with it, ignores the fact that already the collection of admissible evidence presupposes naturalism" (p. 83).
In ch. 5 it is argued that supranaturalistic explanations would be demarcated to the supernatural by being intentional explanations that are only comprehensible if they anthropomorphically expound the explanatory entities. "The transnatural does not possess any kind of explanatory force"; and supernatural explanations explain "everything" or do so falsely. They do not serve as scientific explanations; "Supernatural explanations of a state of affairs s have hardly any more explanatory force than the statement "We do not know what caused s" (pp. 103-104)."
The summary of ch. 6 states, among other things, that what is believed to be empirical verification of the supernatural does not in fact prove to be supernatural, but paranatural; and the supernatural cannot be empirically deduced from the supposed lack of explanation in the normal and the natural. The investigation of nature by natural means cannot go beyond its boundaries (pp. 133-134).
Ch. 7 says that despite the triumph of the real sciences proves metaphysical naturalism, it does not ground it, and that scientific methodology does not get rid of metaphysics by being explained or grounded by metaphysical naturalism. "Scientific methodology is not ontologically neutral with respect to naturalism or supranaturalism, because the latter entails a methodology of its own that is irreconcilable with scientific methodology" (p. 153).
Chap. 8 enunciates that "[t]he relation of naturalism and science is not, contrary to the anti-naturalistic critique, a regrettable self-limitation of science, but the only possibility of objective knowledge," "[f]or the demarcation of science and pseudoclenchism, it is legitimate to use the question of compatibility with metaphysical naturalism as one of several demarcation criteria," and that "naturalism, as a metaphysics of presuppositions, excludes a strong epistemological naturalism, according to which science is not subject to any kind of philosophical presuppositions." That is, metaphysical naturalists cannot be, at the same time, strong epistemological naturalists (p. 174).
Ch. 9 argues that, if religion and science aim to express something true about the world, then they are in contradiction and that scientists who appreciate a coherent representation of the world cannot accept, at the same time, two worldviews with incompatible metaphysics and methodologies (pp. 183-184).
Ch. 10 deals with the conclusion of the book, in short: "Metaphysical naturalism is a necessary condition of the real sciences" (p. 185).
Then come all the notes (pp. 189-214) contained in all the chapters of the book and the abundant bibliography used (pp. 215-228).
In short, it is a very complete work, very useful for those who want to know more about the metaphysical presuppositions of science and scientific research, as well as the demarcation between science and pseudoscience and between the natural and the supernatural and the incompatibility of the latter with a naturalistic and empirical conception of reality.
Huanta, November 1st, 2023.
(Published originally in Spanish in the Peruvian Journal of Applied Philosophy # 24. Translated into English by Deepl.com and reviewed by author).
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